This note will deal with the West Bank, i.e. Judea and Samaria, and with the Gaza strip. The name 'West Bank' may imply a connection with Jordan, and the expression 'Judea and Samaria' has been interpreted as referring to historic claims. Therefore, the neutral expression 'Territories' or 'Administered Territories' will be used. Originally both areas were part of Palestine under the British Mandate, and they were occupied in 1948 by Jordan and Egypt respectively. In 1967 they came under Israeli control as a result of the Six-Day War. The Gaza strip continues to be administered by Israel as an occupied territory, despite the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel in 1979. 18 International Legal Materials (1979) 
I. The Relevant Rules of International Law
Under Regulation 43 of the Regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (No IV), the occupying power is responsible for law and order in the area:
The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country. 2 The occupant's powers are, however, restricted inter alia by those rules of international law which are intended to protect civilians against certain kinds of harsh treatment. The question is whether these rules prohibit the expulsion of persons whose presence in the area endangers public order and safety. The answer has to be looked for in conventional and customary rules concerning the laws of war and humanitarian law.
The above-mentioned 1907 Hague Regulations do not deal with the subject. Some authors have, however, maintained that, despite this silence, a prohibition of deportations was a 'self-understood rule.' 3 It is, however, doubtful to what extent one may assume the existence of a rule to this effect despite the silence of the relevant Convention and of the travaux préparatoires, and in the absence of evidence on corresponding state practice.
The main provision dealing with the subject is to be found in Article 49 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva Convention No IV). The relevant parts read as follows:
Individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive. Nevertheless, the Occupying Power may undertake total or partial evacuation of a given area if the security of the population or imperative military reasons so demand... 4 According to Article 147, unlawful deportation or transfer are among those acts which are considered to be grave breaches of the Convention.
The relevant states, i.e. Israel and her neighbours, are parties to this Convention and hence bound by it. 5 However, thus far Israel has not transformed its provisions into internal law. 6 Therefore it is important to inquire whether, and to what extent, the rule laid down by the above 
II. The Controversy over the Applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention
It thus follows that Article 49 of the 1949 Convention is the main provision to be studied. But a first and preliminary question arises as to whether this Convention does apply at all to the Territories under Israeli control. 11 The Government of Israel has maintained that it is doubtful whether these Territories are subject to the provisions of the Convention due to a precondition to its applicability to cases of occupation laid down by the second paragraph of Article 2 of the Convention:
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace-time, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance... 12 [Emphasis added.] According to the above opinion, since the West Bank and Gaza had been illegally occupied by Jordan and by Egypt respectively in 1948, and the West Bank was illegally annexed by Jordan in 1950, these areas cannot be considered to be part of 'the territory of a High Contracting Party' within the meaning of the second paragraph of the above quoted article. 13 seems that Israel fears that her consent to the applicability of the Fourth Convention would be considered as a recognition of Jordanian or Egyptian sovereignty over the areas. 14 However, Israel decided to act de facto in accordance with the humanitarian provisions of the Convention and has made several declarations in international fora to that effect. 15 Moreover, in certain matters Israel even goes beyond the provisions of the Convention, e.g. the non-application of the death penalty in spite of crimes of great cruelty and the granting to the inhabitants of the Territories of the possibility to submit petitions to Israel's Supreme Court against the Government and its officials. 16 Israel's official attitude concerning the non-applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention has been criticized inter alia by the UN Security Council and General Assembly, 17 by the International Committee of the Red Cross, 18 by the United States 19 and by various writers. 20 According to Professor A. Roberts, the Convention does apply due to the first paragraph of Article 2 (quoted above) which, in his opinion, 'applies when a belligerent occupation begins during war,' 21 and which does not include a reference to the territory of the High Contracting Party. In addition, he considers Israel's attitude to be inconsistent since 'similar objections could be, but seldom have been, made about the applicability of the Hague Regulations, which contain a similar assumption; namely, that occupied territory is "territory of the hostile state,"' 22 or, in the French original: 'territoire de l'état ennemi.' However, according to a detailed analysis undertaken by Professor N. Bar-Yaacov, despite the lack of an express statement on the matter, 'the Government's position regarding the Hague Regulations is identical to its attitude on the applicability of the Geneva Convention.' 23 Lastly, Professor Roberts is of the opinion that there are precedents showing that states have considered the laws on occupation to be applicable 'even in cases that differ in some respect from the conditions of application spelled out in the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Convention.' 24 However, it seems that the rejection of the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention has rather been the rule and not the exception in the practice of states:
There are, in fact, so many situations in which the applicability of the Geneva Conventions ... has been denied that the not uncommon practice has been rejection of the law, rather than its formal recognition and implementation. 25 As to Israel's declaration that it will de facto apply the humanitarian provisions of the Fourth Convention, it has not been considered to be a satisfactory solution. First, because Israel has never clarified which provisions she would consider to be of a humanitarian nature. 26 Second, the rejection of the formal applicability has allegedly been one of the factors why Israeli courts have been reluctant to apply the provisions of the Convention. 27 However, as will be shown later, the question of the formal applicability of the Convention has neither been raised nor contested in the courts, and, to the contrary, the Supreme Court has in fact in many cases been acting as if it were applicable. 28 The impediment to its full implementation by the courts stems not from its non-applicability due to the status of the Territories, but from lack of transformation, as will be shown later. Third, the ex gratia application 'could be construed as carrying an implication that it [Israel] might unilaterally interpret, or eventually abrogate, its terms.' 29 However, disagreement over the interpretation can, and in fact does, arise, irrespective of whether the provisions are applicable per se or by a renvoi via the unilateral declaration. 30 The question may arise whether the provision against expulsion and deportation is of humanitarian nature. Although prima facie it has that quality, it may be argued that under certain circumstances the expulsion of a person who constitutes a severe threat and danger to the inhabitants or to the security forces, does not violate any humanitarian principles. 31
III. The Place of the Relevant International Rules in Israeli Law
Under the legal system applicable in the Territories, deportation orders are issued by virtue of the Defense (Emergency) Regulations, 1945 34 In order that the Court may have authority to deal with a petition against an expulsion on the basis of international law, three conditions have to be fulfilled: first, the rules of occupation must be applicable; second, the relevant rules have to be an integral part of the Israeli legal system; and third, they have to be the kind of rules that bestow upon the individual a right to claim their implementation. 35 It has already been mentioned that the question of the applicability of the rules on occupation has neither been raised nor contested in the Court. Instead, the Government has in fact agreed, since the early days of the occupation, that its acts relating to the Territories should be subjected to the judicial review of the Supreme Court under the rules of international law, irrespective of whether they formally apply.
As to the status of the relevant international rules on expulsions within the Israeli legal system, it depends on the general question concerning the place of the law of nations in Israeli law. 36 Since Israel has no written constitution nor a general written law on the matter, the relation between international law and Israeli law has been established by judicial precedent, and has been much influenced by the British system. Customary international law is automatically part of the law of the land unless it contradicts an express provision of the laws of Israel. 37 Declaratory treaties (i.e. those which are based on customary rules) also are part of the internal legal system by virtue of the custom which they codify. However, constitutive treaties (i.e. those which prescribe new rules), even those to which Israel is a party, and thus bound by them on the international plane, are not automatically part of the law of the land, and their incorporation requires an act of 'transformation' (i.e. an act transforming the international rule into national law), usually an enactment by the Knesset (Israel's parliament) or by an authorized minister. 38 There have, nevertheless, been a few cases where non-transformed treaties or even instruments of a non-legally binding nature have been relied upon. 39 In addition, a presumption in favour of the compatibility of Israel's laws with her international obligations is applied by the courts.
Turning now to the international law of occupation, the 1907 Hague Regulations are regulary applied by the Supreme Court since they are part of a treaty which to a large extent is considered to constitute a declaratory codification. 40 However, with regard to the Fourth Geneva Convention the Court has been of the opinion that most of its provisions, including 35 This third condition will not be discussed in this Note since it has not been dealt with by the Court in this context. In American legal terminology, one would say it is the question whether or not the rule is self-executing. The requirement for a specific legislative act of transformation is usually justified by the fact that in Israel the Executive Branch is responsible for the conclusion of treaties and the Legislature plays only a minor role in the process. See Lapidoth, supra note 36.
It has, however, been maintained that no act of transformation is needed with regard to treaties concerning the laws of war, but this idea has not been followed by the Court; see Rubin, ' 42 It is rather difficult to decide whether a certain provision of the Fourth Geneva Convention is of a declaratory or constitutive nature. As Professor T. Meron has put it:
[a]ll of the [1949 Geneva] Conventions contain a core of principles (e.g. the Martens clause) that express customary law. Of course, the identification of the various provisions as customary or conventional law presents the greatest difficulties. Neither international law nor scholarly studies provide a comprehensive foundation for identifying those rules in Geneva Convention No IV which are declaratory of pre-existing customary law [footnote omitted]. 43 Among those who consider the prohibition against deportation to be a customary rule is Pictet's Commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention which states that '... this point ... may be regarded today as having been embodied in international law.' 44 In support of this opinion, the Commentary refers to the Charter of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal of 1945 and to its judgment. However, these texts dealt only with the crimes of the Nazis, and their drafters had in mind the mass deportations for forced labour and extermination; hence no conclusion should be drawn from these texts with regard to individual expulsions for security reasons.
Professor T. Meron is also of the opinion that Article 49 represents a customary rule, but, interestingly, he adds that '[a]lthough it is less clear that individual deportation was already prohibited in 1949, I believe that this prohibition has by now come to reflect customary law.' 45 The author bases his conclusion concerning the customary nature of the provision on the fact that deportations have been universally condemned by the international community, reflecting opinio juris, and on the general rule against the expulsion of citizens included in various human rights conventions. He also points out that deportation was already prohibited under Lieber's Code of 1863 46 which has had a major influence on the development of the laws of war.
The lack of a provision against deportations in the 1907 Hague Regulations is overcome by those who hold the opinion that it is a customary rule by assuming that the silence of the Regulations 'was probably because the practice of deporting persons was regarded at the beginning of this century as having fallen into abeyance.' 47 This assumption, however, is not convincing with regard to individual expulsions in view of the above remark that 'it is less clear that individual deportation was already prohibited in 1949.' 48 Some experts have expressed the opinion that the provision in Article 49 is partly declaratory and partly constitutive. 49 The question has been raised whether the declaration of the Government of Israel that it will implement the humanitarian provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention has given the courts the authority to request the implementation of those provisions despite the lack of an act of transformation. The opinion of the majority of the Supreme Court, as expressed by President M. Landau, has been that it has no such authority:
The decision of the Government of Israel to comply in practice with the humanitarian provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention ... is a political decision which does not bear upon the juridical level on which this Court must operate. 50 However, Justice G. Bach is of a different opinion. He considers that this is a policy declaration which in principle binds the Government and there may be cases where, in the framework of the rules of administrative law, we will instruct the Government to abide by its commitments. However, each case will be examined according to its circumstances. 51 But, while holding that most of the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention are of a humanitarian nature, Justice Bach doubts whether Article 49 fully belongs to that category:
Article 49 of the Convention is indeed primarily of a humanitarian nature, but it seems that this aspect will not prevail when it would prevent, due to its sweeping formulation, the expulsion of individuals whose removal has been decided upon because of their systematic incitement of other residents to acts of violence and because they constitute a severe danger to public order. 52 In another case Justice Bach expressed the opinion that the prohibition implied in Article 49 against detaining inhabitants of an occupied area in a detention camp located in the territory of the occupying power was not necessarily under all circumstances (i.e. with regard to 'persons who systematically incite to acts of violence') of a humanitarian nature, but he considered that Article 85 of the Convention which deals with the conditions of detention belongs to that category: This is undoubtedly a provision of a clearly humanitarian nature, with respect to which, in my opinion, the Government should be requested to carry out its declared policy, namely, that it intends to abide by the humanitarian provisions of the international Conventions. 53 
IV. The Controversy Concerning the Interpretation of Article 49
Although Israel's Supreme Court has considered itself to be precluded from applying Article 49 because of its conventional nature and lack of transformation, the Court has nevertheless given much thought to the search for the proper interpretation of this provision. Two possible interpretations have been submitted to the Court: either the article prohibits any expulsion, whether individual or collective, for whatever reasons or purpose, or it prohibits only forcible mass deportations for forced labour and similar illegal purposes, as practiced by the Nazis during World War II. The majority of the Court has favoured the second interpretation and has concluded that the expulsion of highly dangerous individuals is not contrary to Article 49. The Court has reached this conclusion since it has been of the opinion that the provision should be interpreted in light of the injustice it was intended to correct and in view of its object, namely, the prevention of the recurrence of the World War II atrocities:
... [T] he purpose which the draftsmen of the Convention had in mind was the protection of the civilian population, which had become a principal victim of modern-day wars, and the adoption of rules which would ensure that civilians would not serve as a target for arbitrary acts and inhuman exploitation. What guided the draftsmen of the Convention were the mass deportations for purposes of extermination, mass population transfers for political or ethnic reasons or for forced labour. This is the 'legislative purpose' and this is the material context. 54 The majority of the Court, led by President M. Shamgar, applied the teleological interpretation after examining the rules of interpretation of Israeli law and of international law. The Court was of the opinion that Articles 31 and 32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties permit a state to interpret treaties in view of their background and their object. 55 Moreover, the Court adopted Professor G.J. Starke's opinion that different parts of a treaty should be given a consistent interpretation in light of existing international law and that ambiguous provisions should be given a meaning which is the least restrictive upon a party's sovereignty. 56 The Court found support for its interpretation in the context, namely, in the fact that the second paragraph of Article 49 deals with evacuation of a civilian population, and the two paragraphs are linked by the word 'nevertheless' (see text supra). 57 According to the majority, due to the broad definition of 'protected person' in Article 4, the adoption of a different interpretation for Article 49, i.e. one that would also prohibit individual expulsion for security reasons, would lead to absurd results since it would also include a prohibition on the expulsion of a person that had entered the area illegally, and would even be an obstacle to extradition. 58 The Court rejected the interpretation favoured in Pictet's Commentary: 'The prohibition is absolute and allows of no exceptions apart from those stipulated in paragraph 2 ...' 59 and relied on Professor Julius Stone's opinion which limits the prohibition in 'Article 49 to situations at least remotely similar to those contemplated by the draftsmen, namely, the Nazi World War II practices of large-scale transfers of population, whether by mass transfer or transfer of many individuals, to more hostile or dangerous environments, for torture, extermination or slave labour.' 60 The express reference in the Article to 'individual ... forcible transfers' did not change the Court's attitude: the majority considered that these expressions also referred to the World War II atrocities since the mass deportations were performed on the basis of individual summons. 61 As to the words 'regardless of their motive,' the Court was of the opinion that they referred to the various motives and pretexts put forward by the Nazis in order to give the mass deportations a semblance of legitimacy. 62 Deputy President Ms. Ben-Porat underlined the need to interpret Article 49 in a manner which would not prevent the occupation authorities from fulfilling their obligation to ensure public order and safety in accordance with Regulation 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations. 63 The teleological method of interpretation adopted by the Court has been criticized by various writers who consider it to be contrary to the rules of interpretation applicable in international law. 64 One of the members of the Supreme Court, Justice Bach, favoured a broader interpretation for the prohibition included in Article 49. In his opinion,
[t]he language of Article 49 is unequivocal and explicit. The combination of the words 'Individual or mass forcible transfers as well as deportations' in conjunction with the phrase 'regardless of their motive', (emphasis added), admits, in my opinion, no room to doubt that the article applies not only to mass deportations, but also to the deportation of individuals as well, and that the prohibition was intended to be total, sweeping and unconditional -'regardless of their motive'. 65 He came to this conclusion since in his opinion
[w]e must not deviate by way of interpretation from the clear and simple meaning of the words of an enactment when the language of the Article is unequivocal and when the linguistic interpretation does not contradict the legislative purpose and does not lead to illogical and absurd conclusions. 66 According to Justice Bach, there are other means than expulsion by which the occupying power can ensure public safety and order in the Territories, in accordance with Regulation 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations. 67
V. Conclusion
This analysis has shown that the controversy over the expulsion of civilians from the territories under Israeli military administration raises difficult legal questions: are those territories subject to the international laws on occupation? Is the prohibition against expulsion included in the Fourth Geneva Convention an absolute one or is it limited to certain kinds of expulsion? Is this prohibition -whatever its scope -merely a rule of international treaty law, or is it also a general rule of customary law? Hopefully the above analysis may help to clarify the issues.
The refusal of Israel's Supreme Court to implement Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention does not stem from a rejection of the applicability of the Convention, but from the lack of transformation of its terms into municipal law. Moreover, the very fact that the Court went to great length to analyze and interpret Article 49 shows that, even in the absence of a formal incorporation, the Court has in practice been considerably influenced and guided by the Convention and has tried to interpret Israeli law in accordance with its provisions. This trend can also be discerned in other cases that deal with different matters, where the Court has in fact measured the acts of the Military Government by the yardstick of the Fourth Convention. 68 Although the Court has formally refused to implement Article 49 and has limited its meaning to mass deportations, the power of the Military Commander to expel or deport is certainly not unlimited, and its exercise is subject to review by the Court, which will scrutinize each case carefully: it will verify the reasonableness of the order and its legitimacy under Israeli administrative law (which includes the principles of natural justice) and international customary rules. Moreover, the mere existence of the Court's review power constitutes a powerful incentive for the military authorities to reduce the cases of expulsion as far as possible.
As to the more general problem concerning the implementation of the Fourth Geneva Convention by Israeli courts, it is submitted that it can be dealt with in one of three ways: first, the Supreme Court can abandon the principle which requires formal transformation of all constitutive treaties; 69 second, parliament can adopt a specific law on the incorporation of the
